What’s in a surname? The role of ethnicity in economic decision making by Ahmed, Ali
www.ssoar.info
What’s in a surname? The role of ethnicity in
economic decision making
Ahmed, Ali
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Ahmed, A. (2009). What’s in a surname? The role of ethnicity in economic decision making. Applied Economics,
42(21), 2715-2724. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840801964609
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-242252
For Peer Review
What's in a surname? The role of ethnicity in economic decision making 
Journal: Applied Economics 
Manuscript ID: APE-07-0106.R1 
Journal Selection: Applied Economics 
Date Submitted by the 
Author: 27-Oct-2007 
Complete List of Authors: Ahmed, Ali; Växjö University, Centre for Labour Market Policy 
Research (CAFO) 
JEL Code:
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior &lt; C9 - Design of 
Experiments &lt; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods, J71 - 
Discrimination &lt; J7 - Discrimination &lt; J - Labor and 
Demographic Economics 
Keywords: Discrimination, Experiment, Trust game, Dictator game 
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
For Peer Review
1
What’s in a surname?
The role of ethnicity in economic decision making
Ali M. Ahmed
Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Management and 
Economics, Växjö University, SE-351 95 Växjö, Sweden. E-mail: ali.ahmed@vxu.se.
Abstract
This paper reports results from two experiments that investigate possible incidence of 
discrimination against people with foreign backgrounds in Sweden. In the first 
experiment, participants played the trust game and the dictator game with co-players of
different ethnic affiliation. The family name of the players was exposed to their co-
players. Results for the trust game showed no significant discrimination against co-
players with foreign backgrounds. On the other hand, the results for the dictator game 
showed a statistically significant discriminatory behaviour by men against co-players 
with non-European backgrounds. The discriminatory behaviour was solely a male 
phenomenon. In the second experiment, the dictator game was replicated to check the 
stability of the results in the first experiment. The second experiment also examined
whether people with foreign backgrounds discriminate against other people with foreign 
backgrounds; that is, the purpose was to discover whether discrimination is systematic. 
The observations in the second experiment underlined the results found in the first 
experiment: Foreign co-players are discriminated against by Swedish players. However, 
we did not find that people with foreign backgrounds discriminated against other people 
with foreign backgrounds. 
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1 Introduction
“What’s in a name?  That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet” 
William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, Scene 2
The challenging circumstances of people with foreign backgrounds on the labour
market in Sweden have initiated a debate on whether people with foreign backgrounds 
are discriminated against.1 When faced with observably similar applicants, do 
employers discriminate by ethnic background? Many will answer “yes”, arguing that 
most people with foreign-sounding names are excluded in the initial stage of the 
recruiting process and will never reach the interview stage. The same problem can be 
expected in other situations (e.g., when people search for apartments). Arai et al. (1999) 
present results from a survey study on a sample of people with foreign backgrounds that 
shows that more than 70 percent of the respondents believed that having a foreign-
sounding name significantly limited their possibility of getting a job.
In recent years, more and more Swedish people with foreign-sounding surnames 
have changed their surnames to Swedish-sounding surnames. The proportion of people 
who changed their foreign-sounding surnames was less than 10 percent in 1999, but that 
number increased to more than 22 percent in 2004—the proportion has more than 
doubled.2 People may change their names for many reasons, but a reason why this 
1 The same debate could probably be found in many other countries as well. But we 
discuss the Swedish case since we conducted our experiments in Sweden. Probably, the 
same argument could be applied to other countries. There are many studies based on 
registered data that indicate discrimination; for example, see Hammarstedt (2001) and 
Rooth and Ekberg (2003) for Sweden and Darity, Hamilton, and Dietrich (2002) and 
Queneau (2005) for the U.S.
2Source: Swedish Patent and Registration Office. In 1999, 1159 individuals in Sweden 
changed their surnames, 114 of whom changed from a foreign-sounding surname to a 
Swedish-sounding surname. In 2004, the corresponding figures were 1252 and 276, 
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proportion may have increased is that people with foreign-sounding names are afraid of 
being discriminated against.3 It is thus possible that foreign-sounding names affect the 
possibility of obtaining a job or an apartment. Or, perhaps, people only think that. Data 
limitations usually make it difficult to empirically test these conjectures. 
We present laboratory experiments to circumvent this difficulty. We investigate 
whether discrimination takes place in two games of economic decision making where 
the surnames of the players are exposed. The first game used is the trust game
introduced by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). In this game, two players receive an 
initial amount of money. The first player, the trustor, is given a choice of sending all, 
some, or none of the money to the other player, the trustee. The experimenter triples the 
money sent. The trustee then chooses how much, if any, of the tripled money to return 
back to the trustor. This ends the trust game. The second game used is the dictator game
introduced by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986). This is a one-stage/two-person 
game in which the first player, the dictator, must decide how to distribute a sum of 
money between her- or himself and a second player, the recipient. The recipient must 
accept the dictator’s decision.
Participants were recruited from two universities, and one of the universities 
contained a large number of students with foreign backgrounds. Ethnicity was signalled
by exposing participants’ surnames to each other. Thus, the question in focus is how the 
information about the co-player’s surname, from which the players are assumed to infer
their co-player’s ethnic affiliation, affects the behaviour of players in the trust game and 
the dictator game. We arrived at the following observations: The findings for the trust 
respectively. It is reasonable to suspect that individuals who changed their foreign-
sounding surname were overrepresented in 2004, since roughly 10 percent of the 
Swedish populations had a foreign background during these years. 
3It should also be mentioned that it is presumably a bigger step to change a foreign-
sounding surname to a Swedish-sounding surname than it is to change a Swedish-
sounding surname to another Swedish-sounding surname.
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game showed no significant discrimination against co-players with foreign 
backgrounds. The results for the dictator game, however, showed a statistically 
significant discriminatory behaviour by men against co-players with non-European 
backgrounds.
We also conducted a second dictator game experiment to check the robustness 
of the results in the first experiment. Another reason for this replication is that we 
wanted to check if discrimination found in the first experiment was systematic, in the 
sense that foreigners themselves discriminate against other foreigners. Hence, the 
question in focus in the replication was whether people with foreign backgrounds 
discriminated against other people with foreign backgrounds. A difference from the 
dictator game in the first experiment is that we did not signal ethnicity by exposing 
participants’ surnames. Instead we recruited participants from Swedish for Immigrants
(SFI) classes and from social sciences classes at the adult secondary schools in Alvesta 
and Växjö, where SFI classes obviously only contain foreigners and social science 
classes contain Swedes. Hence, we did not expose participants’ names at all in this 
experiment. Instead, we exposed which class they belonged to. The results of this 
replication supported the findings in the first experiment: Foreign recipients received on 
average significantly lower amounts than Swedish recipients. However, we did not find 
any systematic tendency of discrimination: Foreign dictators treated foreign and 
Swedish recipients similarly.
There have been few past studies of ethnic discrimination in economics 
conducted in a laboratory setting. Anderson et al. (2006) gives an excellent review of 
studies conducted in economics and social psychology. One study closely related to the 
present study is Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) who also used the trust game and the 
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dictator game.4 The results of their trust game experiment showed that the average 
amount of money sent by male trustors to male trustees of Eastern origin was 
significantly lower than that transferred to male trustees of Ashkenazic origin. The 
transfers of dictators to different ethnic groups in this experiment indicated that the 
distributions were similar. 
There are differences between Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) and the present 
study, however. In Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), in the specifications of the trust
game, only trustors received the initial endowment. With such a design, trustors may 
have other motives (unconditioned to the expected behaviour of trustees), such as 
altruism and fairness, rather than solely investment motives (conditioned to the 
expected behaviour of trustees) when transferring money to trustees. A well-
investigated result in experimental economics is that many individuals want to avoid 
unequal treatment (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). In the present study, unconditional 
motives were not triggered for the trustor in the trust game. By giving both players the 
same initial amount, the trustor’s decision is based on the expected behaviour of trustee.
Another difference in the present study is the use of surnames instead of individuals’ 
full names when signalling ethnicity. This is done to eliminate any gender effects. Even 
if gender effects were controlled, some first names are gender-neutral, which may bias 
the results. A large body of literature suggests that there are systematic differences in 
the behaviour of men and women in economic games.5 Finally, we support our results 
with a replication study that differs from earlier studies regarding how ethnicity is 
signalled in the experiment.
4Bouckaert and Dhaene (2004) is another study that is related to the present study. They 
conducted a trust game experiment, but in the field instead of the laboratory. They did 
not find any discriminatory behavior.
5 See, for example, Holm (2000), Saad and Gill (2001a, 2001b), Solnick (2001), and 
Eckel and Grossman (2001). Eckel and Grossman (to be published) gave an excellent 
overview of experiments with gender in focus.
Page 5 of 25
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
6
Following this introduction, the next section discusses discrimination in the 
experimental games used in this study. Sections 3 and 4 present the first and second 
experiment, respectively, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Discrimination in the trust game and in the dictator dame
Discrimination can be the outcome of various causes. In economics, there are 
commonly two given. Discrimination can occur if economic agents have tastes of 
discrimination (Becker, 1957). For example, employers on the labour market with
specific tastes—for example, preferring people with Swedish backgrounds or disliking 
people with foreign backgrounds—will primarily hire people with Swedish 
backgrounds in an employment decision, even if they know that both groups are equally 
qualified. Discrimination can also be an outcome of stereotypes that, for example, 
involve employers using the ethnicity of employees to make statistical inferences about 
the expected productivity (Phelps, 1972). The outcome of the stereotypes will be 
discrimination, even if discrimination is not the intention, because the employment 
decision will not be based on the employee’s individual productivity but on the 
expected productivity of the group to which the applicant is supposed to belong.
In the trust game, because trustors are uncertain of trustees’ expected behaviour
(their reciprocity or inequality aversion), uncertainty is likely to play an important role. 
Discriminatory behaviour may arise if trustors have negative stereotypes of trustees 
with foreign-sounding surnames (believing that foreigners are less trustworthy than 
natives, for example). Taste-based discrimination, on the other hand, involves people 
simply disliking or preferring members of one group over another. This can also be a 
reason for discriminatory behaviour in the trust game: Trustors do not send any money 
because they do not want to benefit trustees with foreign backgrounds. In the dictator 
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game, however, significantly lower amounts sent to recipients with foreign backgrounds 
are an outcome of tastes, since recipients do not have any strategic role in this game.
With this setup, the causes of discrimination can be identified. If discrimination 
is found only in the trust game, then the discrimination is an outcome of stereotypes. If 
discrimination is found only in the dictator game, then the discrimination is an outcome 
of tastes. If discrimination is found in both games, however, the answer will be
inconclusive.
3 The first experiment
The first experiment compared the strategic behaviour towards people of two groups 
with foreign backgrounds6—non-European7 and European8—and one Swedish group in 
two games—the trust and the dictator game. We conducted sessions in which the 
participants learned the family name of their counterpart, from which they were able to 
deduce their co-players’ ethnic affiliations.9
3.1 Recruitment, participant pool, and matching
The participants were recruited from various summer courses at Växjö University and 
the University College of Södertörn during the first week of June 2003, and the 
experiment was carried out in the following two weeks. The main reason for selecting 
participants from the University College of Södertörn in addition to Växjö University 
6Individuals with foreign backgrounds were individuals who immigrated to Sweden or 
individuals born in Sweden with parents who immigrated to Sweden.
7Includes individuals with non-European backgrounds, except individuals with North 
American and Australian backgrounds.
8Includes individuals with European (except Swedes), North American, and Australian 
backgrounds.
9The written directions and decision sheets are available upon request.
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was that the former university contains a high rate of foreigners. Thus, it was possible to 
conduct an experiment with actual matching of players with different ethnic affiliations.
The participants from Växjö University were assigned the role of trustors, and 
participants from University College of Södertörn were given the role of trustees in the 
trust game. In the dictator game, participants from Växjö University were assigned the 
role of the dictators, and participants from University College of Södertörn were given 
the role of the recipients. Hence, each participant from Växjö University played the role 
of both trustor and dictator, whereas each participant at University College of Södertörn 
played the role of both trustee and recipient. The matching in the dictator game was 
different from that of the trust game.
The recruitment was mostly carried out through course e-mailing, phone lists,
and class announcements, but also with flyers posted and handed out around the 
campuses. In announcing the experiment, students were promised a participation fee of 
SEK100.10 Moreover, they were informed that they would have the possibility to earn 
additional money. Those students who wanted to participate in the experiment were 
scheduled in a session. In order to participate, students had to register themselves either 
directly to the experimenter or through e-mail or phone. Each participant then obtained 
confirmation through telephone or e-mail with information about the time, date, and 
place of their session. 
The recruiting process of participants was first completed at Växjö University. A 
total of 93 students signed up for the experiment, which bounded the total number of 
students that could be recruited at the University College of Södertörn. Hence, the total 
number of pairs was 93; however, two participants did not show up (both at Växjö 
University). Among the remaining 91 participants from Växjö University, 44 were men, 
10Which was equivalent to €11, or $12.50, at that time.
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39 of whom were Swedish, 4 European, and 1 non-European; 47 were women, of whom 
45 were Swedish, 2 European, and none non-European. The participants at University 
College of Södertörn consisted of 48 women, 26 of whom were Swedish, 11 European, 
and 11 non-European, and of 43 men, of whom 18 were Swedish, 10 European, and 15 
non-European. The average participant at Växjö University was 25 years old with 2.6 
years of higher education, and the average participant at University College of 
Södertörn was also 25 years old but with 2.7 years of higher education.
Using the name lists of participants from Växjö University and the University 
College of Södertörn, generated during the recruiting process, each student was 
randomly matched with a student from the other university.
3.2 Experimental procedure
Fourteen sessions were conducted at the University College of Södertörn and eight 
sessions at Växjö University. Each session lasted approximately twenty minutes, and a 
single experimenter conducted all sessions. Participants were recognized and registered 
on arrival. They received a show-up receipt worth SEK100, and were directed to 
assigned seats. Participants were first briefly instructed orally about the tasks to be 
performed, and then they received written information and instructions. The instructions 
included a short statement of purpose: “An experiment of economic decision making”.
After stating the purpose, the instructions continued with describing the procedure and 
the rules of the experiment. Every matched pair of students was provided with exactly 
the same description of the experiment. All players were informed that they had been 
matched with a student from the other university. The family name of the person with 
whom they were matched was written in ink on the decision page. 
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For practical and administrative reasons, the trust game experiment was 
conducted in a reverse manner; that is, first the trustees were approached and then the
trustors. This was possible since the strategy method was used.11 Therefore, in the first 
stage of the experiment, the participants at the University College of Södertörn were 
approached. Participants were told that they had been matched with a student at Växjö 
University, and they both received SEK100 for participating in the experiment. Further, 
trustees were told that while they could pocket their money, their counterparts, trustors, 
had the opportunity to decide whether or not they wanted to transfer any portion of their 
money to them. Trustees were told that the experimenter would triple the amount 
trustors transferred to them. So, if the trustor chose to send SEK90, he or she would 
receive an amount equal to SEK270. At the time, it was not yet known how much 
trustors would transfer. Therefore, trustees were asked to decide how much of the 
tripled amount, if anything at all, they would like to send back to the trustor for each 
and every possible sum transferred by the trustor. Given that the sum of money the 
trustor could transfer was restricted to multiples of 10, trustees were asked to decide 
how much, if anything at all, they would like return to the trustor in ten convincible 
cases. Trustees were told that their transaction would end the trust game and that they 
would be paid on the scheduled day when the trustors’ decisions are gathered and 
payoffs are calculated. When trustees had made their decisions, they were told that they 
would be participating in another game, the dictator game, but their role in this game 
would be passive.
11This method was first proposed by Selten (1967). Rather than observing the 
participant’s behavior in only those nodes a player reaches, the strategy method asks for 
a decision of the participant in every node of the game. There are both advantages and 
disadvantages of the strategy method; see Roth (1995). Most importantly, the advantage 
was the possibility of observing participants’ entire strategies, while a drawback is that 
participants were forced to think about behavior in each node which could lead to 
different outcomes than if the game had been played in an ordinary manner. To avoid 
potential misunderstandings, extensive written and oral information was provided.
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Next, students at Växjö University who had the role of trustor were approached. 
They were provided with the same information and same description of the trust game 
as the trustees. According to the game, they were asked to decide whether or not they 
would like to transfer any amount to the trustees. When the trustors’ decisions were 
made for the trust game experiment and transfer forms had been collected, decision 
pages for the dictator game were distributed. In the dictator game experiment, dictators
were randomly assigned to a different person than in trust game. This experiment 
consisted of only one stage in which dictators were told that the experiment was being 
conducted, again in pairs, and that they were already matched with another student. The 
name of the person with whom they were matched was written in ink on the transfer 
form. The participants were then asked to send some, all, or none of their additional 
SEK100 to their counterpart.
At both universities, after the decisions were made and forms were collected, all 
participants completed a questionnaire containing demographic questions, including the 
players’ gender, age, years in school, major area of study, and most importantly, their 
foreign background, from which we categorized different ethnic groups.
Cash was the only incentive offered. The counterparts to the missing players 
received the average payoffs of the total population.
3.3 Results
We summarized the results by considering separately the decisions made by trustors, 
trustees, and dictators. As mentioned in the previous section, seven trustors from Växjö 
University had non-Swedish backgrounds. These are excluded in the statistical analysis 
below. The analysis is, therefore, based on the remaining 84 pairs of players. However, 
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it is important to add the fact that the results and conclusions of the experiment do not 
radically change by including the (excluded) seven participants.
Exact randomization technique was employed to test the differences in mean.
The Fisher exact probability test was used for 2×2 contingency tables to analyze 
differences in proportions. For measures of association, Spearman’s rank-order 
correlation test based on 10,000 Monte Carlo samples was used. All p-values were 
reported for two-sided tests.12
We first start by discussing the behaviour of the trustors presented in Table 1.
The transferred amounts are out of SEK100; therefore, the numbers in the tables can 
also be interpreted as the average percentage transferred. Rows in both tables identify 
trustors’ gender and the columns indicate the trustees’ ethnic type. The average transfer 
by trustors was 59 percent of the total amount. Men transferred on average 55 percent
and women 62 percent of the total amount. The main question is whether or not co-
players with foreign backgrounds received significantly lower transfers than Swedish 
co-players. If so, then the following null hypothesis should be rejected: Swedish trustees 
and trustees with foreign backgrounds receive, on average, equal transfers from trustors.
[Table 1 about here]
The average amount sent appears to be affected by the ethnic affiliation of the 
trustee, mostly when coming from male trustors. In particular, men transferred on 
average 64 percent to Swedish trustees and only 48 percent to European trustees. The 
corresponding average percentage of money transferred by men to non-European 
trustees was 50 percent. For female trustors, the transferred amounts averaged 65, 57, 
12See Siegel and Castellan, Jr. (1988) for an overview of these tests.
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and 62 percent, when trustees had a Swedish, European, or non-European name, 
respectively. The results showed that it was primarily the males who tended to 
discriminate between different groups. Even though the differences in average transfers 
indicated a discriminatory behaviour against participants with foreign backgrounds, the 
distribution in different treatments was not significantly different. Hence, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. In total, transfers to Swedish trustees averaged 64, while 
transfers to European and non-European B-players averaged 51 and 57, respectively. 
The average transfers in different treatments are not significantly different at 
conventional levels of significance.13
[Table 2 about here]
Trustworthiness is measured as the proportion returned by the trustee of the 
tripled amount received from the trustors. The proportions returned by trustees who 
received strictly positive amounts from trustors are tabulated in Table 2. Rows in this 
table identify the B-players’ genders, and the columns indicate their ethnic type. 
Looking at the whole sample of trustees, the average return to trustors was 40 percent of 
the amount received. The question in this part of the game is whether or not different 
ethnic groups differ in their strategic behaviour. The null hypothesis is that average 
proportions from trustees back to trustors did not depend on the trustees’ ethnic 
backgrounds.
13In the post-experimental questionnaire, trustors where asked to state the amount of 
money they expected their counterpart to send back. There were no significant 
differences in expectations between different groups. However, it is important to point 
out that this analysis was done on individuals who had sent positive amounts. Of course, 
those players who did not send anything did not expect anything in return.
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Table 2 shows that Swedish female trustees who received strictly positive 
amounts from trustors returned, on average, 37 percent of the amount received. The 
average proportion returned by European and non-European female trustees, 
respectively, was 39 and 46 percent. Swedish men returned on average 41 percent, 
while European and non-European men, respectively, returned 46 and 36 percent. The 
highest proportion returned, 46 percent, was by European men and non-European 
women. All differences between various pair-wise comparisons were not statistically 
significant. Hence, the null hypothesis that the distribution of transfers from trustees to 
trustors was independent of the trustees’ ethnic backgrounds cannot be rejected.14
Let’s turn to the results for the dictator game. Since trustors in the trust game 
also played the role of dictators in the dictator game, we first tested whether there were
any significant relationship between the amounts sent by players in the trust game and 
the amounts sent in the dictator game. The Spearman’s correlation test found a slightly 
positive relationship between the amounts sent. The correlation coefficient is r =
0.1727, but the coefficient is not statistically significant.
[Table 3 about here]
The results for the dictator game are presented in Table 3. Rows in Table 3
identify the dictators’ gender, and columns indicate the recipients’ ethnic type. Looking 
at the whole sample of participating participants, the average transfer was 27 percent of 
the total amount. 
14Trustees where also asked to state the amount of money they expected their 
counterpart to send them. There were no significant differences in expectations among
different groups.
Page 14 of 25
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
15
The question is whether or not recipients with foreign backgrounds received
lower amounts than Swedish recipients from the dictators. In that case, the null 
hypothesis that recipients with different ethnic affiliations received the same amount is 
rejected. The results show that the average transfer from male dictators was 26 percent 
when the counterpart had a Swedish name and 27 percent when the counterpart had a 
European name, while the corresponding amount to a recipient with a non-European 
name was only 9 percent. The amount received by recipients with non-European names 
was significantly lower than the amount received by recipients with Swedish names (p = 
0.0732), and recipients with European names (p = 0.0329). On the other hand, female
dictators transferred similar amounts in different treatments: on average, 35 percent to 
Swedish, 29 percent to European, and 29 percent to non-European counterparts. The 
slight difference between amounts received by Swedish and non-Swedish recipients 
from female dictators is not significant.
The average transfer from all dictators to Swedish recipients was 31 percent, 
while the average transfer to European and non-European recipients was 28 percent and 
20 percent, respectively. Non-European recipients received, on average, a significantly 
lower amount than Swedish recipients (p = 0.0789).
4 The second experiment
In the following experiment, we replicated the dictator game. We had two purposes with 
this: First, to investigate to the robustness of the result found in the previous dictator 
game experiment, as the difference between the amount donated to Swedish and non-
European participants was significant but only on a 10 percent level of significance. 
Second, we wanted to investigate whether the discrimination found in the dictator game 
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was systematic in the sense that not only Swedish people discriminate against foreign 
people but also foreign people themselves discriminate against other foreign people. 
4.1 Experimental design
The design in the following experiment is slightly different from the design in the first 
experiment. As an alternative of focusing on specific ethnicity, we only signalled 
whether a co-player was foreign or not. We did this by recruiting participants from
Swedish for Immigrants (SFI) classes and from social sciences classes at the adult 
secondary schools in Alvesta and Växjö. Hence, we did not expose participants’ names 
at all. Instead, we exposed only to which class they belonged. We will, from now on,
refer to participants from SFI as foreign participants and to participants in social 
sciences classes as Swedish participants. The experiment was conducted on different
occasions in 2006. Both Swedish and foreign participants were assigned the role of the 
dictator, and both types of participant were paired with either a Swedish or a foreign 
participant. 
The recruitment was carried out directly in classes before a scheduled lecture.
Students were informed that they had the possibility of participating in a study 
immediately after their lecture, and to appreciate their participation they would be 
treated with a cup of coffee (actually they received SEK10 that they could use to buy
coffee or whatever they liked). Additionally, they were told that they had the possibility 
of earning up to SEK100 in the experiment. Those students who wanted to participate in 
the experiment simply stayed after their lecture.
A total number of 236 students participated in the experiment: 116 were foreign
and 56 of these were men, and 120 were Swedish and 49 of these were men. The
average age of foreign and Swedish participants was 28 and 27 years, respectively.
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Four sessions were conducted with foreign participants, and four sessions were 
conducted with Swedish participants. Each session lasted approximately ten minutes,
and a single experimenter conducted all sessions. Participants were first briefly 
instructed orally about the tasks to be preformed and then they received written 
information and instructions. The instructions included a short statement of purpose, 
which stated: “An experiment of economic decision making”.
After stating the purpose, the instructions continued by describing the procedure 
and the rules of the experiment. All participants were informed that they would be 
matched with another person. Participants were told that they had to decide how to 
divide SEK100 between themselves and their co-player. Participants were told to 
carefully think about their decision since one person in each session would be randomly 
selected and be paid according to his or her decision. The participants were then asked 
how much of SEK100 they would like to give their counterpart. After the decisions 
were made, the forms were collected. The forms also included questions about 
participants’ genders and ages. After collecting the decision forms, one person in each 
session was randomly selected to realize the experimental outcome.
Participants were in one of two treatments. In the first treatment group,
participants were told that they had been matched with another person in an SFI class. 
In the second treatment group, participants were told that they had been matched with 
another person in a social science class. This information was given both in the written 
instructions and orally. Other than this, all other information was identical in both 
treatments.
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4.2 Results
The results for the replication are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 tabulates the 
results for Swedish dictators and Table 5 the results for foreign dictators. Rows in the 
tables identify dictators’ genders and the columns identify the recipients’ ethnic type. 
Let’s start by studying the behaviour of Swedish dictators. Looking at the whole sample
of Swedish dictators, the average transfer was 18 percent of the total amount. 
[Table 4 about here]
The first question is whether or not foreign recipients received lower amounts 
than Swedish recipients from the dictators. In that case, the null hypothesis that foreign 
and Swedish recipients received the same amount is rejected. The average transfer from 
all Swedish dictators to Swedish recipients was 23 percent, while the average transfer to 
foreign recipients was only 14 percent of the total amount. Hence, foreign recipients 
received almost nine percentage points less than Swedish recipients, a difference that is 
statistically significant (p = 0.003).
A closer look shows that the average transfer from Swedish male dictators was 
21 percent when the recipient was Swedish and only 9 percent when the when the 
recipient was foreign. The amount received by foreign recipients was significantly 
lower than the amount received by Swedish recipients (p = 0.007). Swedish female
dictators transferred 24 percent to Swedish recipients and 17 percent to foreign 
recipients. This difference is only weakly significant (p = 0.120). Hence, as in the 
previous experiment, discrimination seems to be concentrated among males, even 
though there is an indication that Swedish female dictators also discriminated against
foreign recipients.
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Next, the question is whether foreign dictators themselves discriminate against 
foreign recipients, or if foreign dictators discriminate against Swedish recipients. If this 
were the case, the null hypothesis that Swedish recipients and foreign recipients would 
receive equal amounts from foreign recipients is rejected. 
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 shows that, overall, foreign dictators gave on average 9 and 8 percent of 
the total amount to Swedish and foreign recipients, respectively. Thus, it seems like 
there is a systematic discrimination against foreigners. However, the small difference is 
not statistically significant. A closer look at the gender level reveals that there are some 
minor differences in amounts received by foreign and Swedish recipients. However, all 
these differences are statistically insignificant. 
5 General discussion
The purpose of this study was to study ethnic discrimination by using laboratory 
experiments. First, the study investigated how the information about co-players’ 
surnames affected the behaviour of players in two games: the trust game and the 
dictator game. So how important are the characteristics that indicate that an individual 
has a foreign background? How did the information about co-players’ surnames affect 
players’ behaviour? What is in a surname? 
At the first sight, the average amount sent by trustors to trustees seems to be 
affected by trustees’ backgrounds in the trust game. However, the differences were not 
statistically significant. Hence, the conclusion is that information about trustees’
surnames did not influence the behaviour of trustors in the trust game. The result of 
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trustworthiness was measured as the proportion returned by trustees of the tripled 
amount received from the trustor. The results indicated that there were no considerable 
differences between different groups of trustees. In the dictator game, similar amounts 
were sent by female dictators to different groups of recipients. However, male dictators 
sent a significantly lower amount to recipients with non-European backgrounds 
compared with recipients with a Swedish backgrounds and European backgrounds. 
Let us compare the results of the first experiment with Fershtman and Gneezy 
(2001). In contrast to Fershtman and Gneezy, who found very strong evidence for 
discrimination in the trust game, this study found no significant discrimination in this 
game. In another contrast with Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), the present study found
discriminatory behaviour in the dictator game. Yet an interesting observation by both 
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) and the present study is that discrimination was a male 
phenomenon. It was only men who discriminated in these experiments.
A limitation of the first experiment is that it only studied the behaviour of 
dictators with Swedish backgrounds with recipients of different ethnic affiliations. Even 
if this case were the most interesting to study, since foreigners still are a small minority 
in Sweden, it motivated the second experiment that investigated the behaviour of 
individuals with foreign backgrounds toward other individuals with foreign 
backgrounds. This type of investigation gave us the possibility of studying whether 
discrimination is systematic or not (i.e., whether individuals with foreign backgrounds 
themselves discriminate against other individuals with foreign backgrounds). Also, the 
dictator game results of discrimination in the first experiment called for a replication. 
The results of the replication study supported the first experiment; that is, recipients 
with foreign backgrounds received, on average, lower amounts than Swedish recipients. 
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Also, the gender effect was also found in the second experiment. However, we found no 
evidence pointing at systematic discrimination of individuals with foreign backgrounds.
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Table 1: The average amount sent by trustors
Type of trustee
Gender of trustor Swedish European Non-European Total
Female 64.76 (21) 56.67 (9) 62.00 (15) 62.22 (45)
Male 63.53 (17) 47.50 (12) 50.00 (10) 55.13 (39)
Total 64.21 (38) 51.43 (21) 57.20 (25) 58.93 (84)
Note: Amounts sent are out of SEK100. Number of participants in each cell is given in 
parenthesis.
Table 2: The average proportion returned by trustees
Type of trustee
Gender of trustee Swedish European Non-European Total
Female 36.68 (19) 39.42 (9) 45.88 (9) 39.58 (37)
Male 40.81 (15) 45.83 (8) 35.65 (14) 39.95 (37)
Total 38.50 (34) 42.44 (17) 39.65 (23) 39.76 (74)
Note: Number of participants in each cell is given in parenthesis. The proportion is 
calculated as the amount trustees returned divided by three times the amount trustors
sent. Since ten trustors sent zero amounts to their counterparts, the total number of 
trustees who received strictly positive amounts is 74.
Table 3: The average amount sent by dictators
Type of recipient
Gender of dictator Swedish European Non-European Total
Female 34.76 (21) 29.00 (10) 29.29 (14) 31.78 (45)
Male 25.56 (18) 27.00 (10) 9.09 (11) 21.28 (39)
Total 30.51 (39) 28.00 (20) 20.40 (25) 26.91 (84)
Note: Amounts sent are out of SEK100. Number of participants in each cell is given in 
parenthesis.
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Table 4: The average amount sent by Swedish dictators
Type of recipient
Gender of dictator Swedish Foreign Total
Female 23.51 (37) 17.06 (34) 20.42 (71)
Male 21.20 (25)  8.75 (24) 15.10 (49)
Total 22.58 (62) 13.62 (58) 18.25 (120)
Note: Amounts sent are out of SEK100. Number of participants in each cell is given in 
parenthesis.
Table 5: The average amount sent by foreign dictators
Type of recipient
Gender of dictator Swedish Foreign Total
Female 10.00 (30)  8.00 (30) 9.00 (60)
Male  8.51 (27)  7.93 (29) 8.21 (56)
Total  9.30 (57)  7.66 (59) 8.62 (116)
Note: Amounts sent are out of SEK100. Number of participants in each cell is given in 
parenthesis. 
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